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A New Look at the Antitrust Laws*
By MORTON S2ThNBERG

*

The horizontal and vertical growth of American business over
the past six decades (since the passage of the Sherman Act in
1890) continually raises new economic and legal problems. These
problems call for a new look at the antitrust laws and at the
national antitrust policy with respect to their interpretation and
enforcement.
In considering the national antitrust policy a basic postulate
comes to mind regarding the aims of such a policy. Our society is
dynamic in character. The fulfillment of the needs of yesterday
have created the wants and the problems of tomorrow, and will
continue to do so. A hundred years ago ours was principally an
agricultural economy. Three-quarters of a century ago was the
age of the "robber barons." A half century ago there was a merger
heydey. Obviously, no one of these is an exemplary base period
from which to draw, in determining upon the aims of a national
antitrust policy. Fundamentally we seek to assure the continuation and strengthening of a national economy in which competition flourishes in the midst of efficient mass production and consumption. Only then may we be guaranteed continuation of those
twin blessings: economic democracy and the highest standard of
living in the history of mankind. Stated another way, we want the
blessings of bigness in business without the evils of monopolization of business. This in abstract should be the national antitrust
policy. When we come to the implementation of the national
policy there is need for more specificity. Implementation, in one
sense, is more important than policy. What is done in the name
of policy may undo it.
In considering implementation of the national antitrust policy
questions involving monopolies are of the first order, rather than
* The opinions expressed are personal and do not purport to reflect the official
views of the Department of Justice.
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those involving restraints of trade or unfair trade practices that
merely lessen competition. This is because effects adverse to the
national welfare are probably not felt or realized until the restraints or practices have resulted in monopolization. The great
oak casts no shadow while but an acorn.
Much of the recent literature on antitrust problems has consisted of a re-examination of the philosophy of the antitrust laws
and its application to the workaday world of American industry.
The burden of this literature is not against continuation of the
antitrust laws, nor against their basic objective: maintenance of
free enterprise in the United States. Mainly it has been a plea for
a new look at the law, its interpretation and enforcement, in the
light of modern industrial and economic realities, as seen by the
authors of such literature.
The proponents of a new look at the antitrust laws urge
such practical tests as Effective Competition or Workable Competition, as the formulae to apply in determining whether interstate or foreign trade has been in fact restrained, or whether such
trade within a particular industry has been monopolized, or such
monopolization has been attempted. Their position appears to be
that in' seeking, through enforcement of the law, to maintain
free enterprise, the federal government has, in effect, whittled
away and discouraged free enterprise by failing to take cognizance
of industrial and economic realities. In short, they would apply
the Rule of Reason' to each individual situation, rather than rigid
formulae, e.g., the rule that price-fixing is illegal per se regardless
of the circumstances behind2 the pricing mechanism operating
within a particular industry.

However, if there is to be a re-examination of the Rule of
Reason, there should be common agreement as to its meaning and
influence in the historical development of the antitrust laws and
their enforcement. It is significant that the Supreme Court found
a combination in illegal restraint of trade in the Standard Oil case
The Rule of Reason was first announced as a basic doctrine in American
antitrust jurisprudence in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, et al v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Supreme Court ruled, despite a vigorous dissent
by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the legislative terminology of the Sherman Act, "restraints of trade" and "attempts to monopolize and monopolization.., took their
origin in the common law . . ." and therefore only unreasonable restraints are a
violation of the law.
-United States v. Trenton Potteries Company, 273 U.S. 392, 396-397 (1927);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
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(supra) after holding that a restraint first must be found to be
unreasonable, and that fourteen years earlier the Court found a
combination in illegal restraint of trade in the Freight case3 after
holding that a restraint as such need not be unreasonable to be
illegal. In the Standard Oil case the Court held that the defendants had restrained trade, among other things by securing
for themselves preferential freight rates from railroads, price cutting, espionage, operating bogus independent companies, and
engaging in other unfair practices. The Court held these practices unreasonable. In the Freight case the Court held that the
.reasonableness" of the freight rates, the combination of competing railroads had agreed upon, was not an issue. Therefore,
the Government was not obliged to prove that, under the common
law, agreements among competing carriers to maintain even
reasonable rates were void as restraints of trade. In short, in the
Standard Oil case, the Court held, in effect, that unfair practices
are obviously unreasonable. In the Freightcase, it held, in effect,
that price (rate) fixing among competitors is obviously unreasonable, regardless of the "reasonableness" of the rates. In both cases
the Court construed the Sherman Act in the light of reason. In
both cases the Court found the statute itself not unreasonable.
Had the ruling been otherwise, in either case, the statute might
not have met the constitutional test
What is apparently meant, therefore, when reference is made
to the Rule of Reason is a rule of reason: the reasoning of rational
men in the setting of their time and the particular circumstances of
a given situation. Under the common law a rule of reason was first
applied to restraints of trade in an economy made up of small
craftsmen and individual enterprises. The modem corporation
was unknown. The Industrial Revolution fathered an entirely
different economy as its long range effects began to be felt, particularly in the United States. Therefore, when we go back to the
common law for an understanding of the Rule of Reason, these
distinctions should be borne in mind.
Application of a rule of reason in today's economic setting
merely because it was applied in the 18th or 19th century English
economic setting may or may not be wise. To illustrate: the common law recognized that a simple transaction between seller and
'United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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buyer temporarily eliminated from the market place the sale of a
similar commodity to the same buyer or the purchase of the same
commodity by another buyer. Obviously, this was a restraint of
trade, but not an unreasonable one. Thus was a rule of reason
applied. Whether or not to apply such a rule of reason to a 1955
full requirements contract must be determined in the light of the
economic realities of today. Is it a reasonable restraint upon trade
for a seller who controls a substantial share of the market for a
particular commodity to obtain an agreement from a buyer to fill
all of his requirements for that commodity only from that seller?
If it will not in fact promote effective or workable competition
among the seller and his competitors, and if, in fact, it may constitute an effective restraint upon the freedom of trade in that
commodity, then it becomes an unreasonable restraint upon trade.
The conclusion derives no less from an application of the Rule of
Reason.
It would appear that even more caution ought to be used if the
common law rule of reason is to be applied to modem monopolies
than to modem restraints of trade because there is so little historical experience to draw upon (except with respect to state or state
granted monopolies) from the craft societies of the preceding
centuries. It is perhaps the nearly total absence of private monopolies in the common law past that has caused the courts to
recognize the relationship between restraints of trade and monopolies. Under the common law rule a restraint of trade was unreasonable if a monopoly might result. Therefore, an individual's
freedom to contract was considered the best insurance against the
rise of monopolies. Under modem case law certain acts are illegal
(as distinguished from unreasonable) even though the means employed are not inherently illegal, because they create a restraint
of trade or a trend toward monopolization, or are such as to indicate an attempt to monopolize.4
In seeking to avoid the pitfalls of cliches and to resort to reason
in enforcing the antitrust laws, the question arises: just what do
we want from a national antitrust policy? To merely conclude
that we want workable competition because it is well recognized
that perfect competition is a classical myth, is not enough. To
merely conclude that to maintain workable competition, all we
'Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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need to do is to apply the classical rule of reason is not enough.
Man is a rational being and even a per se rule has behind it a
priorl reasoning. Without basic objectives and standards for
reaching these objectives, we only compound confusion. There
may be as many rules of reason as there are judges and juries.
Their number may be limited only by the limitations upon the
ingenuity of rational beings.
Accordingly, we must go back to first things in order to agree
upon a national antitrust policy. It cannot, for example, be concluded that a certain practice or course of conduct is a reasonable restraint upon trade and therefore legal because of its beneficial economic effects unless there first is agreement as to what
is beneficial and what is harmful to the national economy.
It is not a valid assumption that big business and economic
democracy are incompatible. On the other hand, business so big
that it threatens economic democracy is obviously bad. Economic
democracy is not a mere abstraction. It is the fibre out of which
our pattern of life and thinking has been woven. It spells economic opportunity for the little man. It means an economic
climate in which a little business may become a big business. It
is the assurance of continuity and vigor in our middle class without which political democracy would soon wither away. So the
basic question may be: how big is too big? And the answer is
that when size carries with it a genuine threat to economic
democracy, it is too big. But size is relative. The degree of
bigness in one industry may constitute such a threat. The same
degree in another industry may not.
Certain basic tests of too bigness may be developed and recognized. They have to do with the fundamental postulates of our
economic philosophy. According, they are not concerned with
the jurisprudence growing out of mere legalisms that conform to
particular judicial decisions, or even out of particular laws. If
such postulates are to continue as fundamental and legalisms
(whether in the nature of legislative or judge-made law) endanger
their continuance, the jurisprudence, not the postulates, will give
way. As the late Justice Cardozo pointed out:
Sooner or later, if the demands of social utility are
sufficiently urgent, if the operation of an existing rule is sufficiently productive of hardship or inconvenience, utility
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will tend to triumph. 'The view of the legal system as a
closed book was never anything but a purely theoretical
dogma of the schools. Jurisprudence has never been able
in the long run to resist successfully a social or economic
need that was strong and just.'5
Accordingly, in determining the basic antitrust question: how
big is too big, we are more concerned with economic and political
consequences than with legal precedents. If the "social or economic need" is sufficiently "strong and just," then the proper legal
test is the logic of probabilities i.e. the probability that the test
will measure up to that need. The following basic tests of too
bigness in business are suggested, without implying that they include all such tests, should be applied in this order, or are the ones
most appropriate in every set of circumstances.
1) What is its effect on the proper conservation of natural
resources?

2) Are competitive advantages enjoyed merely because of
size or because the public benefits in terms of superior
quality, greater variety, better service, or lower prices?
3) Is the field in economic fact, as distinguished from legal
fiction, open to newcomers?
4) Are suppliers or buyers utterly dependent on the big
company, or are they reasonably independent of it?
5) Are the limits of its market economically defensible?
6) Is price normally consistent with reasonable utilization
of capacity?
Conservation and development of domestic natural resources,
next to conservation and development of human resources with
all that the latter implies, is the most important single domestic
aim of an intelligently organized society. Theodore Roosevelt
recognized this a half century ago and his name ever since has
been associated with conservation programs. It may be more
than mere coincidence that he is also known to American history
as the "trustbuster." For the patterns of land use, timber grabs,
minerals waste and other raids upon the public domain, during
the last half of the 19th century, were often tied to the monopolistic activities of those days. Accordingly, one test to determine
whether a certain business organization, alone or in a concert of
duopoly or oligopoly, has become too big, is to ascertain to what
BENJA~mN CAtozo, TnE GRowTH op THE LAW

(1924) 117.
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extent, if any, it controls the use of a natural resource and what
social or antisocial use it is making of that control. Use is also a
factor because conservation implies more than to conserve in a
literal sense. Disuse or failure to use under certain circumstances
may be just as wasteful as to squander natural resources under
other circumstances.
Too bigness should not be determined only by capital structure or volume of sales. Too often these are considered the only
criteria. True, a company with a substantial surplus has an advantage over a competitor when the going is rough during economic depression, because of greater buying power in terms of
carload lots, et cetera or because of its financial ability to retool
and redesign, or to spend more on advertising. But these are not
unfair competitive advantages unless (i) the capital aggregation
was acquired ab initio by unreasonable restraints of trade or attempts to monopolize, or by unfair trade practices (ii) the benefits
of volume discounts are not passed on to the consumers, and (iii)
the advertising has no social value in terms of bringing to the attention of the public a genuinely better product or service for less
money. Emerson's maxim about the public beating a path to the
doorway of a builder of a better mousetrap has no modern economic reality in the light of present day advertising techniques,
and sales displays.
Legal fictions alone are not the proper crucible in which to
test economic realities. The newcomer to a particular trade or
industry may have every legal right to enter the field, unless of
course it is a public utility. But to stop there is to ignore the facts
of economic life, if in truth the right is illusory. There is just as
much practical justification for claiming a legal body for the ghost
of such a right as there would be to claim that a field protected
by patent rights is open to unlicensed newcomers. If, in fact, prohibitively large aggregations of capital are required; if, in fact,
peculiar skills are required and know-how is not available or
closed off to the newcomer; if, in fact, necessary raw materials
are not available to him; if, in fact, other sine qua non ways and
means are not his to adopt or acquire; then the field is not open to
newcomers no matter how the law reads. To ignore such economic realities is one certain way to assure the growth and continued operation of monopolies.
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The fourth test of too bigness also has to do with economic
realities as distinguished from legal fictions. When, in fact, the
big company is in a position to dictate the marketing policies and
prices of its suppliers, it is too big for the welfare of the country.6
This is not to deny the legitimate economic influence inherent in
the fact that the big company is ergo a big buyer of raw materials.
But such influence should be held within reasonable bounds. The
suppliers should be able to seek and find other outlets (in competitors of the big company, or in kindred or other fields) without facing bankruptcy if the big company outlet should be suddenly closed to them.
For the same reasons and to the same reasonable degree,
buyers should be only reasonably dependent on the big company
for the product of its operations." Here too, legitimate economic
influence must be recognized. The big company would be a misnomer if its share of the market was not significant. But it should
not be a position e.g. to force a "full line" on a reluctant customer.8
And the buyer should be not only free to buy elsewhere without
fear of reprisals in time of scarcity, but actually have a choice at
practically all times. Without the stimulus of competition quality
decreases and price increases. To expect otherwise in a society
where profit is a legitimate motive is to expect too much of
human nature.
One of the principal difficulties confronting antitrust lawyers,
economists and judges arises out of attempts to define the "market" of a particular industry or company. Definition is necessary
because without metes and bounds it is impossible to determine
the extent of the control or influence exercised. To the big company the market may be horizontal or vertical or both i.e. the
company may be so integrated that it not only produces the raw
materials that go into its end product, but also constitutes a source
of supply of such materials for its competitors in their manufacture and sale of such end products. It may be their principal
source of supply. Or the supply also may be a raw material for
the production of other end products manufactured by a quite
8
United States v. The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc.,
173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1946).
'United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 110 F. Supp. 295, 336,
346 (D. Mass. 1958).
'United States v. International Harvester Company, 274 U.S. 693, 704
(1927).
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different industry. The company's own end product may first pass
through several processing stages whereas some kindred companies are set up to complete only partial processing and their
market for the semi-processed end product may include direct
competitors of the big company. Or there may be a number of
end products involved, each of which is suitable only for a different end use. The possible industrial and commercial "combinations" within a loosely-defined industry are apparently as unlimited as the number of combinations of moves on a chessboard.
The test as to whether the ramifications of such "combinations"
are economically defensible is not limited to a determination of
the relative efficiency or inefficiency of the ramified operations or
whether price benefits, if any, accrue to the consumer. Primarily,
the test is whether the degree of influence brought to bear, far
afield from the company's main operations, on the social and economic welfare of the country in other fields of trade and commerce, is good or bad.
Some students of the American scene, gazing into their crystal
balls, forecast that future historians will name the application of
the principle of mass production to industrial operations as our
greatest single contribution to the forward march of mankind.
Whether these soothsayers are entirely right is here irrelevant;
that they are partially right appears obvious. Mass production is
itself a product of American industrial genius. Without it our
material standard of living would be much lower. Without it
time for leisure would be greatly reduced. Time for leisure is the
mark of an advanced civilization. A human society that devotes
most of its hours to acquiring food and shelter is only a little
above the level of a society of animals. Time for leisure accelerates
the civilizing process, provided of course the leisure is used intelligently. It allows for study, self-improvement, spiritual contemplation, and greater individual participation in communal
non-economic activities. A growing capacity for mass production
tends to progressively reduce working hours and increase leisure
hours. Therefore, the measure of capacity for mass production
and the utilization of such capacity so that reductions in unit
costs result and are passed on in lower prices to the consumer,
are major tests of whether a big business is too big for the public
weal. A big company that, in periods of economic normalcy,
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operates at near capacity and regularly passes the benefits of
mass production on to its customers is performing a public service
and should be encouraged to continue to do so. On the other
hand, the big company that, in such periods, operates at well below its reasonable utilization of capacity is doing a disservice,
particularly if it is the largest single factor in the industry and it
is the "price leader" or otherwise dominates the field. Such surplus capacity, if in fact it be surplus, may be the result of inefficiency, the influence of substitutes entering the competitive
field, or conscious retention of excess standby facilities erected or
maintained to discourage newcomers from entering the field. Accordingly, the big company may be too big because the public
welfare demands that violence done to the principle of efficient
mass production should not be condoned.
A number of tests of too bigness have been suggested. But
how does a business, in the sense here discussed, become too big?
The answer brings us back to the question of when is trade and
commerce unreasonably restrained or competition lessened by
particular trade practices. We might lightly dispose of the question by answering: when the restraints or practices promote or
tend to promote monopoly. Obviously, the answer is not that
simple. Restraints of trade and trade practices are many and
varied. The nature of the business and the circumstances involved
are significant factors. To separate the reasonable from the unreasonable, the fair from the unfair, in their varied settings, is no
simple task.
A.big company may become too big by violating (a) Sections
1 and/or 2 of the Sherman Act9 (b) Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 0 (c) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended 1 (d) Section 8 of the Robinson-Patman Act' 2 or (e)
all four of these basic laws and/or other related laws.
' Section 1 prohibits '"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . ." Section 2 prohibits
any person to ".

.

. monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire

with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ...
10Prohibiting "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce..
'Forbidding a corporation to ".... acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where . . . the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lesson competition, or tend to
create a monopoly . . ."
"Forbidding any person ... to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction or
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In a temporal sense too bigness arrived before the last three
of the aforementioned laws and amendments were enacted. As
so often happens in a democratic society (where both "our side"
and the "wrong side" have access to the public forum and where
it is hoped they will continue to have such access), legal remedies
for social ills are not discovered and applied until the illness assumes epidemic proportions. It was not until 1914 that "unfair
methods of competition," although never sanctioned under the
common law, were formally put under the ban of statutory law.
By that time the moral tone of the business community had risen.
Of course, it had not risen to such an extent as to make the Federal Trade Commission Act an anachronism.1 3 But failure to
recognize the problem and to enact preventive legislation twenty
years earlier was enough to give evil trade practices a head start
before their economic consequences were realized.
So too, it was not until 1914 that acquisition of the capital
stock of competitors was expressly prohibited by law, where such
acquisition would substantially lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly. The first "age of mergers" was a decade behind
us in 1914 when the Clayton Act was passed. Thereafter, the
economic highway was strewn with the empty carcasses of corporate entities. It was not until 1950 that the Clayton Act was
amended by prohibiting acquisition of the physical assets of competitors where such acquisition would likewise lessen competition
or create monopoly. These failures, even more than the delay
sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors
of the purchaser . . . to sell, or contract to sell . . . at prices lower than those

exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying
competition, or eliminating a competitor . . or to sell, or contract to sell, goods
at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor."
This is reminiscent of a true story told by Assistant Attorney General Stanley
N. Barnes in an address to the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association in Boston on August 27, 1953. Judge Barnes noted that frequently
lawyers for certain businessmen charged with violation of the antitrust laws will
assure him of their clients' respectability and the absence of moral wrong in the
conduct of their business. To illustrate, Judge Barnes told of a protestation of
innocence "made with regard to a situation where force was alleged to have been
used. When violence was denied by defendant's counsel, I asked him what about
that certain incident when X's truck was shot at, by certain individuals using
rifles, the bullets from which penetrated X's windshield. I was told that no bullets
were actually fired; that it was a coca-cola bottle that had been thrown through the
windshield. It is difficult for me to understand how any case involving such facts
can be described as moral, or how those who commit such acts believe they did no
wrong."
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in banning unfair trade practices, contributed to the growth of
too bigness in American industry.1 4
In some respects restraints of trade, and the trade practices
that lessen competition or tend to promote monopoly, lend themselves less to fundamental tests of unreasonableness or unfairness
than does too bigness on the part of a dominant company in a
particular industry. This is because (i) at testing time the evil
effect may not even have been visited upon the industry and (ii)
if it has, it may appear to be or actually be, at that juncture, so
picayune as not to apparently warrant governrmental interference.
Yet these are frequently the acorns from which the great oaks of
industry grow. To the extent that fundamental tests may be devised the following are suggested, again without implying that
they are all-inclusive, applicable to all circumstances, or that they
should be applied in this order.
1) Does the restraint or trade practice unduly interfere in
the affairs of competitors, their suppliers, or customers?
2) Does the restraint or trade practice tend to encourage or
discourage the dynamics of growth and progress within
the industry?
3) Does the restraint or trade practice tend to discourage
newcomers to the industry?
4) Does the restraint or trade practice tend to concentrate
or artificially regulate production or marketing or induce
higher and unreasonable prices?
5) Is the restraint or trade practice, measured by the ethical
standards of a truly competitive economy, basically unfair?
As was observed above, every business act involves some degree of restraint upon a competitor or competitors. But this is the
stuff of competition. When a merchant advertises his wares in
the local newspaper he is attempting to bring the superiority of
his product over that of his competitor (either in terms of quality
or price) to the attention of the public. To the extent that he
succeeds, his trade practice (in this case, advertising) restrains
the business of his competitor. No responsible person considers
this trade practice either unreasonable or unfair, or an undue interference in the competitor's business. Or suppose this merchant
' United States v. Columbia Steel Company, 334 U.S. 495, 582 (1948). See
also dissenting opinion, Hamilton Watch Company v. Benrus Watch Company,
Inc., 206 F. 2d. 738, 740-742 (2d. Cir. 1953).
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determines that his competitor's sales manager would be an asset
to his business, accordingly offers him an increased salary, and
hires him away from his competitor. If this were considered
unfair it would not only penalize the sales manager (who, in the
best American tradition, is trying to get ahead in the world), but
would give the competitor an advantage he deserved only if he
chose to meet the salary increase offered his sales manager.
Again, suppose the merchant decides he could better display his
wares (and therefore perhaps show up his competitor's wares to
a disadvantage) by installing a new window front. Obviously,
this is not unfair, nor if successful, an unreasonable restraint of
trade. In fact, it might stimulate trade and thus indirectly redound to the benefit of his competitor. The foregoing "straw
men" were not set up merely to be "knocked down." They illustrate that there is a large area in which the forces of ingenuity,
drive, initiative and imagination (so typical of the American free
enterprise scene) can maneuver, in a truly competitive sense. It
can bring satisfaction and profit to those applying such forces
and also constitute a service to society without undue interference
in the affairs of competitors, their suppliers or their customers.
True, these illustrations are confined to the retail level. They cover
types of business that would be, in a Darwinian sense, primitive
forms compared to the complex vertical and horizontal dinosaurs
of big business. But the basic principles are the same. The manufacturer or processor also uses the medium of advertising. His advertising may be on a national scale. He may buy ten times the
volume purchased by his nearest competitor. But this fact would
not necessarily justify a threat to cease using a particular product
unless the seller furnished him discriminatory advertising allowances not offered to competitors." The manufacturer may be also
looking for better personnel. But this would not necessarily justify
offering his competitor's personnel better employment provided
they brought with them the competitor's legitimate trade secrets."0 The manufacturer may want to stimulate his business
in an area of the country where his competitor has a freight advantage because of the proximity of the latter's manufacturing
plant to the market. So he might legitimately seek a railroad
3'A & P case, supra.
"'Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Car Equipment, et al., 1 F.T.C.
144 (1918).
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siding near which to erect adjacent competing facilities. But
this is a far cry from seeking to offset the freight advantage by
attempting to influence rate-making bodies to publish a freight
rate having the effect of overcoming the competitor's geographic
advantage. A competitor may refuse to do business with suppliers
(whether the supply consists of advertising, transportation facilities, or raw materials) unless they refuse to give him an otherwise
unfair advantage. He may refuse to sell to customers unless they
agree to be his exclusively. 17 This is not competition. This is
dictation and there is no more room for dictatorship in an economic democracy than in a political democracy.
One of the characteristics of the American scene is growth.
We refuse to stand still. "Bigger and better" may be a cheap
slogan. But in American industrial and commercial life it has
meant more for less, more important in terms of quality and innovation than in terms of quantity and price. It has contributed
to our well-being. In terms of food and drugs it has strengthened
our health. In terms of shelter and clothing it has added to our
creature comforts. In terms of national defense we are infinitely
stronger because of this drive for material progress. Because of
it we have had and continue to have enough left over of our
civilian and military production to make the free world much
stronger. Accordingly, any restraints or trade practices that tend
to discourage the dynamics of growth within any segment of
American economic life, whether they be in the food industry,
pharmaceuticals, building construction, armaments, textiles, or
any other segment, should be held unreasonable and unfair.
Monopoly bespeaks an absence of competition, not in a legal
sense its total absence, but a degree of monopolization that invests power in the monopolizer to exclude or destroy new competitors.' 8 Thus the seeds of monopoly are present in any restraint
or trade practice that tends to discourage newcomers. Anything
that makes it difficult or impossible to enter a field obviously discourages the newcomer. Such difficulties may have to do with
the then state of business-a recession or depression. They may
have to do with a paucity of capital or with the lack of specialized
' Standard Oil Company of California, et al v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949).

"United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (1945);
The Lorain Journal Company, et al v. United States, 842 U.S. 143 (1951).
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knowledge of the industry on the part of those who otherwise
might like to enter the field. Obviously, for these difficulties
existing competitors are not to blame. A business man is not expected to finance a potential competitor or give him his knowhow, any more than he should be expected to furnish him with
his customer lists. But suppose the competitor alone, or together
with other members of the industry (through their trade association or otherwise), circulates in the trade false statements about
the integrity, ability or financial responsibility of the newcomer. Or suppose a member of the industry operating a vertically integrated enterprise lets it be known that it would be unable to fill the raw materials needs of newcomers, when this is
not the fact; or uses its influence in banking circles to impede the
financing of the new competitive enterprise. Or suppose an existing member of the industry threatens a patent infringement action
against the newcomer, when in fact there is manifestly no basis
whatsoever for such a suit. The newcomer might have to consume all of his meager capital merely to establish that fact in
court. These illustrations may be multiplied a hundredfold. They
do not constitute acts of genuine competition, first because the
newcomer is not yet a competitor, and second, because such acts
do not result in the customer public getting a better product,
a better service, or a better price.
In a normally free market the law of supply and demand
determines the price of a given product. Of course there are other
factors under abnormal conditions. But they are not due to competition or the absence of competition. War may have intervened. The government may have undertaken to stockpile the
product for reasons of national defense. For the same reason, or
to stop inflation or both, the government may have taken over as
sole buyer and/or seller of the strategic material. Enemy submarines may have cut off or substantially reduced the domestic
supply of the imported product. Normal operations in one industry or one company may throw the entire economy off balance
or threaten the entire national defense program. We have found
this to be particularly true in the 6ase of such strategic and basic
materials as aluminum, copper and steel. Accordingly, raw materials may be perforce channeled to particular end uses, depriving whole industries of their sources of supply, thereby cutting
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down the production of certain other end products at the very
time when the public demand for them is increasing. Most of us
are familiar with such economic abnormalities (which, alas, appear to be "normalities" in a world of continuing political tensions), having lived through World War II with its Controlled
Materials Plan, government buying through the Metals Reserve
Corporation, wartime substitutes for household gadgets, et cetera.
In a normal market these factors are absent. The factors that
induce a particular company to expand or contract production,
or to raise or lower prices are: general business conditions or business forecasts, finances, labor relations (strikes or threats of
strikes), competition from substitutes, new markets or increased
or decreased demand from existing markets, seasonal or other
weather conditions, and a host of lesser factors. The adverse business factors mentioned are normal in the sense that they may
spring neither from the influences of war or threats of war nor
from concert of action among competitors within the industry.
We should not expect a business man to maintain or expand
production in the face of falling demand. But we should expect
and insist that the decision be his; that it be reached independently and without prior consultation and/or agreement with
his competitor or competitors. However, production and marketing practices are not limited merely to expansion or contraction in times of prosperity or depression or because of the circumstances of war or peace. A normal market may be a limited
market because the nature of the product makes for a static demand. There may be just so much to go around, sales promotion
and advertising to the contrary notwithstanding. Or it may be a
market in which the only genuine competition may allegedly come
from substitutes,"9 or one in which the only customers are the state
and federal governments, or there is only one supplier of the essential raw materials. 2 The nature of the market determines to
what extent and how it may be concentrated or artificially regulated. If it is inherently a limited one, the principal conipetitors
may allocate most of the market among themselves, on a volume,
customer, or geographic basis. They may try to keep out substitutes by legislation favoring their product. In bidding for state or
u United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Company, Inc., 118 F. Supp.
41, 52-53, 197-208 (D. Del. 1953).
"Alcoa case, supra.
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federal contracts an individual competitor may endeavor to induce public officials to draw closed specifications describing only
his product. Or there may be an agreement among the ostensibly
competing bidders to submit uniform bids. A competitor may
seek a discriminatory price in his favor from the sole supplier of
the raw materials for his end product. Each of these devices
tends artificially to concentrate the production and marketing in
the hands of one or a few big producers or sellers. It is not necessarily a better product, a better service or a lower price that brings
this about. Rather, it is a conspiracy or combination unreasonably
to restrain trade, or the commission of an unfair trade practice.
It should be borne in mind that the ultimate aim of all such
restraints and practices has to do with prices. They may be to
obtain higher prices or to stabilize prices i.e. to keep them from
falling. Regardless of the nature of the practices employed or of
the ultimate aim, when the devices are such as to set in motion
economic forces that artificially regulate the supply and demand
and therefore the price, they not only violate the normal laws of
economics in a competitive society but also the antitrust laws.
We, as a people, have a reputation for good sportsmanship.
The boxer who makes a practice of hitting below the belt soon
disappears from the ring. The "fixed" fight is decried. The bully
who beats up a little guy frequently has to have police protection
from a mob. We do not pit 200 pounders against 120 pounders,
high school teams against college teams. Our athletic events are
competitions in skills. Let the best man or the best team win.
The loser is a good sport "or else." This sporting attitude not only
has made our athletes among the best in the world, it has strengthened our moral fibre as individuals and our moral stature as a
nation. By and large the tradition of fair play has been observed
in the American world of business competition. In the American
tradition, the business competitor does not seek a crutch from the
outside, special consideration from the referee, nor the right to a
head start. To win means to give the public more for less at a
larger profit to him, because of the superiority of his product or
service, mass marketing practices, efficiency of plant, or other
factors peculiar to and indicative of his superior skills. 21 So the
last fundamental test of the reasonableness of a restraint of trade
I Alcoa

case, supra, at p. 430.
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or the fairness of a trade practice suggests that we'apply to the
world of business the basic tenet of the world of sports: fair play.
It may not be easy. Usually the best things do not come easy.
Some economic technicians may argue that it is impossible because the two worlds are so different. But ethics that are a part of
a way of life do not condone immoral conduct in one segment of
that life while condemning it in another.
Until 1936 the national p6licy toward enforcement of the
antitrust laws was one of maintaining "hard" competition in all
areas of the economy, with some notable exceptions hereinafter
mentioned. In that year the Robinson-Patman Act was passed.
Among other things, it made unlawful"... any discount, rebate,
allowance, or advertising service" which discriminated "against
competitors of the purchaser" in their purchase "of goods of like
grade, quality and quantity . . ." Many serious students of the
antitrust laws believe that this act "softens" competition, thereby
creating confusion because of its inconsistency with the national
policy of "hard" competition. According to these students of the
subject, this section of the Robinson-Patman Act protects the high
cost operator, whereas the "organic law" (the Sherman Act) is
intended to protect the low cost operator; that it gives the former
the undeserved crutch against his competitor. Obviously, it is
not simple' to reach a facile conclusion regarding this complex
subject. In one sense it poses the question: shall so-called small
business be shielded and protected from so-called big business?
In another sense it asks: shall one of the tests of too bigness be
that it competes too vigorously with small business? Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of easy solution, the answer to both
questions is No! In the kind of competitive world necessary to
the maintenance of economic democracy, all businesses, large and
small, must "stand up and fight." We have no desire to become a
nation of small shopkeepers. This would be the ultimate end if
it was the national policy to mollycoddle small business at the
expense of big business. It would stifle all of the initiative to
growth. On the other hand, a nation devoid of small shop-keepers
is'a nation that has lost its political as well as its economic liberties. When a small business grows into a big business it acquires
larger social responsibilities. To attempt to avoid such responsibilities is as much a sign of immaturity in a big business as it is
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in a small business that expects to be shielded merely because of
its size.
However, there are many areas of our economy in which businesses large and small have been protected from "hard" competition. The Federal antitrust laws cover foreign as well as domestic
(interstate) commerce. Yet, large and varied areas of the economy receive tariff protection from foreign competition. The little
as well as the big "butter and egg man" under the law gets price
support for his farm products, thereby in at least partial effect
repealing for him the law of supply and demand. The business
of selling insurance and the operations of many cooperative enterprises are exempted in whole or in part from the provisions of the
Sherman Act and hence from the "hard" competitive influences
brought to bear in other areas of the economy. State fair trade
laws permit a manufacturer of trade-named articles to fix their
resale prices by contract with one retailer and thereby bind all
of the non-signatory sellers in the state not to sell such articles
below such resale prices.2 2 The wisdom or folly of tariff protection
and of farm parity price maintenance are not determined solely
by their affect on domestic competitive enterprise. Neither are
the state fair trade laws. More often than not, they have a "softening" influence. Enumeration of these statutory exemptions from
the "hard" competition provisions of the Sherman Act is not meant
to imply that they represent sound or unsound legislation. It is
intended to suggest only that (i) "soft" competition under law
is not a novelty introduced by the Robinson-Patman Act, and that
(ii) constructive criticism of either the law or of its administration
should not rest, even in part, on its alleged irreconciliability with
the national policy of "hard" competition.
On June 13, 1938, the 75th Congress authorized the establishment of a select committee and directed it, among other things,
to make a full and complete investigation and study of the concentration of economic power in the American society. This group
2Prior to the enactment of the McGuire Act (amending Section 5(a) of the

Federal Trade Commission Act) in 1952, the Supreme Court held in Schwegmann
Brothers, et al v. Calvert Distillers Corporation, 341 U.S. 384 (1950) that the
Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act did not require such non-signatory
sellers to maintain these resale prices. The United States Court of Appeals (Fifth
Circuit), in June of 1958, held that the McGuire Act made such contracts binding
on non-signatories. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Market v. Eli Lilly and
Company 205 F. 2d. 788 (5th Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court, on October 19,
1958, refused to hear an appeal from this decision.
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was designated the Temporary National Economic Committee
and has become popularly known as the TNEC. The TNEC
made investigations into nearly every facet of our economic life.
On the basis of these investigations extensive and intensive studies
were made.
One such study, published in 1940,2" undertook a "social audit"
of the performance of particular industries e.g. furniture and automobiles; of groups of industries e.g. manufacturing and finance;
and of individual companies e.g. United States Steel Corporation
and American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Among these
tests were measurements of the degree to which the particular industry, the groups of industries, and the individual companies,
provided maximum consumption, minimum costs (in terms of resultant low prices), maximum employment, and maximum utilization (no waste) of capacity. The extent to which these 'social
objectives were met, according to the authors, determined whether
the "social audit" disclosed a profit or loss to society.
These tests were valid in 1940. They are valid today. In terms
of a new look at the antitrust laws they furnish long range significant guideposts. In terms of restraints of trade or monopoly
trends they may furnish legal justification for invalidating certain
industrial practices and validating others. Production measurements disclose possible restraints on production, or the absence
of such restraints. Employment measurements my disclose
whether the technology of the industry, group or company, is
static or dynamic. Minimum cost measurements may not only disclose the degree of efficiency of operations, but also the presence
or absence of competition in terms of the level at which prices
are pegged to such costs.
However, the authors of Monograph 7 admit that these tests
do not constitute:
. . . a complete or thorough-going audit... For they give
no indication of such vitally important facts as . . . opportunity for new entrants . . . tariff-or-subsidy-or-nuisance
costs to consumers and the like. None of these tests indicates whether business is making wise use of our natural
resources... The impact of business ... on the spread...
of scientific economic fact. Nor is any measurement made
TNEC Monograph No. 7 entitled Measurements of Social Performance of
Business, 1940.
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of the extent to which the dollar sign has been placed on the
cultural, and ethical aspirations
sacred religious, aesthetic,
24
of the American people.
Some of these are touched on above: the wise use of natural resources; the wise use of advertising. Even though the impact of
business (the "dollar sign") on the artistic, intellectual and moral
standards of society cannot be measured with any scientific gauge,
it need have no stigma attached to it. The dollar sign may be a
good symbol. For the business of making money, in its finest
sense, is the business of producing and distributing wealth from
the ground, the air, and the waters around us to the entire community.
...The

truth is, business does not exist to make profits any

more than we live to eat. On the contrary, it exists to perform a service for the community. Now, unquestionably,
profits make it possible to perform that service. They provide a guidepost to those industries which society considers
should be expanded.... For business has, first and foremost, a moral purpose-namely, to perform a necessary
service for the community; profits, on the other hand, in
terms of values, come second. 25
Business ethically conducted perforce adds to the moral tone
of the whole community. A jungle philosophy about competition
depresses the moral tone. A national antitrust policy should take
into account the ethical as well as the material considerations involved in producing or getting the "mostest for the leastest." It
should be flexible enough to measure ends by the means employed
and means by the ends to be reached. And it should recognize
that competition itself is but a means to an end. The end is not
only the creation of a cornucopia out of which will flow an abundance of housing, food and clothing for every man, woman, and
child, but that in the process each individual will grow in intellectual and moral stature and human dignity.

2bid. 5.
= Excerpt from an address by John S. Coleman, President, Burroughs Corporalion, at the Commencement Exercises of Bethany College, Bethany, West Virginia,
June 7, 1953.

